Chapter 1—Our Knowledge of God

Dorman’s discussion of general revelation makes me think of many things. Here are a few: The created world shouts God to us (Ps. 19:1; Rom. 1:20). Were it not for sin, we would see this and know it clearly. It is interesting how the Bible holds us morally responsible for things that might not seem that clear due to sin; yet, there are times and places where they are clear. For example, I have often wondered about the magi from the East. Did God specially reveal something to them, or where they simply perceiving the “proclamation in the skies” of the Great King’s birth? In light of the Bible’s references to the constellations (Job 38:31-33; Job 9:9; Amos 5:8; Isaiah 13:10) might they have seen signs in these? If we believe God created and “names” the stars, then the constellations are of divine, not pagan, origin. They are meant to tell God’s story, and they apparently did to the magi.
Regarding "inward" general revelation, it has always intrigued me how Kant dismissed every argument for God based upon reason and the creation (teleological, cosmological, ontological), but he embraced the moral argument based on an inward sense of an approximate "Golden Rule." Kant is aware of these things outwardly through special revelation, but he rejects that due to his epistemological skepticism towards such “knowledge.” Yet he comes to similar conclusions from inward general revelation. I would not ask Kant for much help in formulating a theology, but I think we can see demonstrated in his case a congruence between inward general revelation, whether "conscience" or "judicial sentiment," and special revelation. Both have the same source—God. And, as we'll see, both must be judged in the light of Scripture.
In the end, general revelation is sufficient so that we are without excuse (Rom. 1:19-20). I'll let Calvin close:

"It were, indeed, a strange defence for man to pretend that he has no ears to hear the truth, while dumb creatures have voices loud enough to declare it; to allege that he is unable to see that which creatures without eyes demonstrate, to excuse himself on the ground of weakness of mind, while all creatures without reason are able to teach." Institutes (1.5.15)